Saturday, December 23, 2017

Word Violence and the Weaponization of Narrative-A view From Cuba on the Violernce of Words and the Control of Narrative; Thoughts on "Ni 'gusanos' ni disidentes: respuesta a una publicación católica cubana"

(Pix credit: By Michael Linnenbach - first upload in de wikipedia on 09:58, 16. Feb 2005 by Michael Linnenbach, CC BY-SA 3.0,

Americans have their foibles; especially those that emerge from out of the Academy.  But this is not one of them.  I am speaking of the eruption (again) of national discussion about the use of words and their presentation before audiences (willing or not)--the encouragement of free speech and the suppression of words and speakers in the name of the protection of the innocent from the violence of words.

As I have noted elsewhere, it is not words that are at the center of the controversy--it is the narratives to which these words may be deployed ("The University in the Age of the Learning Factory: Dueling narratives in the culture war around higher education,"). This becomes clearer when one stops for a moment indulging a hyper focus on the national discussion within a peculiar segment of American society and considers the issue in a different national and political context.

This short essay considers the current battles over the control of the narratives to which words are deploys, suppressed and managed--but from the context of Cuba, a nation where one might take state control of those battles for granted but within which even there, the state appears merely as one of several actors  in the battle for control of the way orthodoxy is constructed and protected through the deployment of words. My purpose here is neither to take a position on the opinions of others (on every side of this issue here and elsewhere) but merely to note the difficulty of speaking to these issues outside of politics. Perhaps there is no "higher law" of free speech--there is merely the recognition that the ideology of speech is itself an expression of the orthodoxies that ideology is meant to protect.

An additionla  POSTSCRIPT, a March 2018 letter from Jaime Leygonier directed to the Father Superior of the Jesuit Order in Cuba on the same themee  (Carta 2da. a Superior Jesuitas de Cuba: Sancione subordinado libelista según Derecho Canónico)

The issue of the violence of words has been much in the news of late, and a wonderful engine for generating the sort of demand for the production of social media, the press, and others who make their living (or derive their social position, their political influence or their authority) from the management of the mass consumption of words. See, e.g., here, here, here, here, here, and here.  

Yet it is also clear from the words a violence debates that it is not the words themselves but their context that is at issue--the way that the words invoke an alternative narrative that may challenge an orthodox way of understanding the word and ordering society.  Here Judith Butler has been most clear about  the importance of the "meaning" battles to the protection of emerging orthodoxies to which she is sympathetic of communities, at least int he academy, against a narrative orthoxy which she finds repulsive.
If free [s]peech does take precedence over every other constitutional principle and every other community principle, then perhaps we should no longer claim to be weighing or balancing competing principles or values. We should perhaps frankly admit that we have agreed in advance to have our community sundered, racial and sexual minorities demeaned, the dignity of trans people demeaned, that we are, in effect, willing to be wrecked by this principle of free speech, considered more important than any other value. If so, we should be honest about the bargain we have made: we are willing to broken by that principle, and that, yes, our commitments to dignity, equality, and non-violence are, for better or worse, secondary. Is that how we want it to be? (Judith Butler, On Free Speech, Berkeley Faculty Association (Dec. 2017); and contra HERE).
Judith Butler, of course, sounds a bit like John Adams in supporting his Alien & Sedition Acts; or for that matter the supporters of the Sedition Act of 1918 (Pub.L. 65–150, 40 Stat. 553, enacted May 16, 1918). Both Professor Butler and President Adams have the same political agenda--the protection of values (political values) that require the policing of words and the protection of their meaning, producing words that cannot be uttered in public and those that must.  Even more ironic, it is hard to distinguish between the ideals about speech that Professor Butler expounds and those of the Administration of President Trump that is also protective of their version of a proper social order in to that end might also suppress words (e.g., here).  But his is not the only effort to ban words in furtherance of a political project--however worthy in the eyes of its advocates (e.g., here).  This is not to criticize any of these actors but merely to suggest that there is a long and grand tradition in this Republic to demand speech rights while seeking to develop narrative orthodoxy and then to demand speech suppression when one's narrative orthodoxy becomes established.

If at some extreme President Trump and Judith Butler are two sides of the same coin, that is they are more alike than different in their taste for speech and in their desire to "make America great again" each in their own way, then what separates them are the premises and narrative content, and the orthodoxies, each represents and seeks to protect through speech and against the speech of others.  And that brings us back to politics--and to the endless discussion of the breadth to which this Republic will tolerate contests among narratives seeking dominion. And in the United States, we have embraced both simultaneously.
To take one example, the University of Michigan — one of the nation’s most prestigious public universities – in one policy condemns “bias-related incidents” such as “making fun” of a “person’s accent” or “insulting . . . someone’s traditional manner of dress or geographic origin.” Yet the university then declares, in an entirely different policy: “Expression of diverse points of view is of the highest importance, not only for those who espouse a cause or position and then defend it, but also for those who hear and pass judgment on that defense. The belief that an opinion is pernicious, false, or in any other way detestable cannot be grounds for its suppression.” (here)
The fundamental position of politics in the drive to manage words and to invest words (and meaning) with the violence that threats to political and social narrative inevitably represents as against counter-narrative, is an ancient and famous insight.
Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. . . . he cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendancy engaged in the direst excesses; in their acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm to glut the animosities of the hour. (Thucydides III 69-85, The Civil War at Corcyra)
And, indeed, for society at large, the battle among these narratives is useful, preserving a bot of social fluidity and responsiveness as cultural and political expectations change and with them the economic context in which institutional decision making is made.  Thus the academy (and the political establishment) build their narratives on a meta-narrative of compliance and economic maximization that seeks social harmony and stability overall all. In the risk less university a narrative of harmony (whatever its specifics. . that really does not matter for institutional survival).

Where words become the weapons of persuasion and where such persuasion threatens orthodoxy or power, then the word are suppressed in order to suppress the underlying narratives, the supporting premises, and the cultural implications for which these narratives are deployed. So, indeed, we use shorthand when we speak to the violence of words.  When we speak to the violence in words, we are actually identifying the narratives those words are meant to invoke.  Society--even the freest ones--are always in the business of suppressing ideas; those narratives we (and by "we" I mean those within the hierarchies of social, economic, cultural and religious power, or who seek through the narrative wars to secure a place within them) find beyond the tolerable boundaries of our orthodoxies. The "speech-narrative wars" in the academy then become understandable as political battles for cultural dominance.
Perhaps students aren’t confused at all. Perhaps they’re merely good learners. Colleges by word and deed teach students that there is “free speech” — the speech they find valuable enough to protect — and “not speech,” the expression they really, really don’t like. The gay pride flag? Speech. The Confederate flag? Violence. (here)
The American academy, then, reflects the wider insight that freedom marks the political outer boundary of speech and that orthodoxy will always find a way to suppress that which it deems a threat to its dominion. Those boundaries differ from culture to culture and are sometimes not just culturally but historically defined. And they are quite dynamic. 

To understand the American context in which the contests for narrative power through the control and suppression of words is undertaken, it is useful to consider how these contests play out in other political systems where it is harder to hide the politics of word control behind the veil of high concepts and "values balancing" that mark the peculiarities of American discourse. To say that "hate speech can be violent by nature (here) is politics; words (and their narrative agendas) are not naturally imbued with a pacific or violent nature--that is what politics is for.  And yet that produces the most remarkable aspect of the current debate--in a context in which it is a not palatable to ban  ideas; one can achieve a functionally equivalent objective by banning words

But that produces another irony--or perhaps a contradiction: even as an orthodoxy fights strenuously to control the use of words and the articulation of narrative that is viewed as threatening to its hegemony, that very orthodoxy then becomes  master at deploying words violently against those it considers threats.  In the united States those words are easy enough to identify.  Consider this headline: Donald Trump is a 'racist, misogynist bully' and shouldn't be invited to the UK, says Lib Dems' Deputy Leader. And one becomes a master at using words against others--words that serve as both accusation and judgement.  And thus when one speaks to the notion  Orthodoxy--especially in the academy, but also in politics--is perfectly adept at deploying the violence in words as their opponents, and to do it quite conscious.  Again back to the politics of meaning. 

But this is a politics with a long tradition in authoritarian states. To that end I offer the example of Cuba, where ideas do not die (las ideas no se matan) but where those who express them in certain ways might be punished (Ruminations 66/Democracy Part 37: "Las Ideas no se Matan;" Thoughts on the Death of Fidel Castro Ruz).   Here one sees the very real effect of the regimes of word use  that is at the center of the American debates, for which knowledge provides little solace and no solution.  And it reminds one of the contextual element in the violence of words--for orthodoxy words are authoritatively violent against the ideas antithetical to its core premises and taboos.  It is the unorthodox that always seek the protection of speech rights.   Speech rights are always sacred in the defense of a community and its orthodoxy and always violence to those who threaten.  That is the lesson for the Academy in the United States; an unpleasant one where the university must at once serve orthodoxy (however defined) but whose own narrative is meant to cultivate the unorthodox.  Where there are substantial fights over orthodoxy, it is possible that all words and concepts are inherently violent.

In his essay, "Ni “gusanos” ni disidentes: respuesta a una publicación católica cubana: Resulta lamentable lo aparecido en “Vida Cristiana” el pasado domingo" [Neither "worms" nor dissidents: response to a Cuban Catholic publication: It is lamentable what appeared in "Christian Life" last Sunday] published in CubaNet on 21 December 2017), Rene Gómez Manzana, a well respected independent journalist in Cuba, speaks to the violence of words and their use in a very different context.  It may provide insights to enrich the discussion in the United States. It's most important element, from my perspective, is the way in which he evidences the power of word meaning and the way in which it is violence (against narrative) even when it does not violate individuals. Yet it also suggests that it may be possible to embrace the idea that ll words are violence, but that where violence is directed against a narrative, against the idea and premises of cultural, those words are both dangerous (in an authoritarian regime) but necessary in a Republic founded on its capacity to manage the violence against orthodoxies on which your social order is based. 

The essay appears in the original Spanish along with my English translation.

Rene Gómez Manzano
Dec. 21, 2017
LA HABANA, Cuba.- Durante mi carrera como periodista independiente en Cuba, más de una vez he tenido que rebatir planteamientos calumniosos hechos por los poderosos medios de propaganda castristas. Lo que nunca pensé es que llegaría un día como hoy, en que el objeto de mis refutaciones tuviera que ser un trabajo publicado en la pequeña prensa católica del país.

Se trata del Número 2769 del plegable hebdomadario Vida Cristiana. Esa publicación consiste en una simple hoja de papel gaceta y tamaño legal, impresa a cuatro páginas, que cada fin de semana se entrega a los fieles después de misa. Su modesta tirada se ajusta a las limitadas posibilidades editoriales con las que cuenta la institución más antigua de nuestra Patria.

La publicación es tan modesta que ni siquiera se vende. Su primera plana siempre está dedicada a un tema relacionado con la liturgia de la palabra de ese domingo. Otras secciones fijas contienen el santoral y las lecturas bíblicas de la semana, así como algún soneto del prolífico hermano Jesús Bayo.

Los restantes trabajos —ninguno de los cuales excede de una página— narran experiencias vivenciales o eventos eclesiales; de modo eventual, consisten en un artículo de opinión. Yo, como católico practicante, en ocasiones puedo no estar de acuerdo con alguna de las tesis esbozadas en estos escritos, pero mi discrepancia no ha pasado de ahí, pues los planteamientos se hicieron con el debido respeto al prójimo. No se trata de algo que deba asombrarnos, pues eso es lo que cuadra a una publicación cristiana.

No sucedió así con el artículo de esta semana que provocó mi malestar y motivó estas líneas. Se trata del trabajo intitulado “El Amor Todo lo Puede”, escrito por Julio Pernús. A pesar del título, que se reproduce en la línea final de la obrita, ésta parece inspirada en un odio visceral contra “el otro”, en el desprecio más profundo hacia el que piensa o actúa diferente. Se trata, como es obvio, de sentimientos naturales en un comunista, pero no en un católico.

En un párrafo digno del olvido, el autor, refiriéndose a Estados Unidos, plantea: “Como muchos miembros del pueblo cubano tengo familiares allí, que por cierto no son gusanos, lumpens ni disidentes. Son personas honestas y trabajadoras que decidieron emigrar” (…).

Insisto en que jamás pensé leer palabras como ésas en una publicación cristiana. El término despectivo “gusano” fue ideado y empleado sin recato alguno por el fundador de la dinastía castrista para referirse a otros seres humanos que discrepaban de él y de sus erradas políticas; fue pronunciado desde elevadas tribunas y utilizado de manera habitual como parte inseparable de la neolengua “revolucionaria”. El vocablo “gusanos”, en boca de Fidel Castro, fue un hermano carnal de “las cucarachas” a las que gustaba injuriar Adolfo Hitler y de “las ratas” del norcoreano Kim Il-Sung.

Se trató de un medio grosero, pero por desgracia efectivo, de denigrar al adversario, de ningunearlo y convertirlo en “no persona”. Su empleo en el lenguaje cotidiano constituyó el prólogo imprescindible para transformar a todo el que discrepaba en objeto válido de cuanto abuso y cuanto atropello se les ocurrieran a los jerarcas del Nuevo Régimen. ¿Qué corresponde hacer con un gusano? ¡Despreciarlo y aplastarlo!

Pero el uso generalizado de dicha palabra, con ese sentido, data de los primeros tiempos de la Revolución, décadas atrás. En fechas recientes, no la he leído ni siquiera en el Granma, lo cual es mucho decir. De hecho, en esa acepción peyorativa no recuerdo haberla visto impresa desde hace años, hasta que ahora Vida Cristiana —¡nada menos que un periódico católico!— volvió a utilizarla.

Algo parecido —aunque ya no tan claro— sucede con el neologismo “lumpens”. Por supuesto que esta voz tiene su significación correcta, pero también ella ha sido prostituida por el totalitarismo. Durante el Éxodo del Mariel, ese término se aplicaba no sólo a los convictos sacados de las prisiones u otros antisociales (que en puridad podían merecer ese calificativo, lo que no justifica que se les insultara así de manera pública). También se usó para las personas decentes recogidas por sus familiares.

Por último, Pernús incluye a los “disidentes”; es decir: presenta al que discrepa como otra supuesta personificación del mal. Salvando las distancias, ese párrafo bochornoso me recuerda una anécdota de la República Dominicana. En las primeras elecciones democráticas celebradas allí tras la eliminación del tirano Trujillo, hubo dos candidatos presidenciales favoritos: Viriato Fiallo y Juan Bosch.

En un mítin de campaña, el primero se refirió a todos sus compatriotas, pero pretendió puntualizar el concepto con unas palabras repulsivas: “Los negros, los mulatos y las personas decentes”… La frase, de claro contenido racista, pronunciada en un país donde el proceso de mestizaje está muy avanzado, puso de manifiesto que el señor Fiallo, además de un hombre malo, era un pésimo político. No en balde Bosch ganó a sombrerazos.

Ahora Pernús hace algo parecido. Para cerrar con broche de oro su repugnante párrafo, pone de un lado a “gusanos, lumpens (y) disidentes”. Del otro, frente a ellos, coloca a las “personas honestas y trabajadoras”. ¡Y que una cochinada como ésa la hayamos tenido que leer en un órgano cristiano!


Rene Gómez Manzano

HAVANA, Cuba.- During my career as an independent journalist in Cuba, I have had to refute slanderous statements made by the powerful Castro propaganda media on more than one occasion. What I never thought was that there would come a day like today, when the object of my refutations had to be a work published by the small Catholic press of the country.

This refutation is directed to Number 2769 of the weekly pamphlet, Christian Life [Vida Cristiana]. This publication consists of a simple sheet of legal paper and legal size, printed in four pages, which each weekend is delivered to the faithful after mass. Its modest circulation is constrained by the limited editorial realities faced by the oldest institution in our country.

The publication is so modest that it is not even sold. Its front page is always dedicated to a theme related to the Liturgy of the Word for that Sunday. Other fixed sections contain the Calendar of Saints and the biblical readings of the week, as well as some sonnet of the prolific brother Jesús Bayo.

The remaining works-none of which exceeds a page-narrate experiences or ecclesial events; its later pages consist of an opinion article. As a practicing Catholic, I can sometimes disagree with some of the assertions outlined in these writings, but my disagreement has not gone beyond that, because the arguments were made with due respect to others. That is something that should not surprise us, because that is what befits a Christian publication.

Not so with this week's article that caused my unease and motivated these lines. It is about the work entitled "Love Makes All Possible" ["El Amor Todo Lo Puede"], written by Julio Pernús. Despite the title, which is reproduced in the final line of the work, it seems inspired by a visceral hatred against "the other", in the deepest contempt towards those who think or act differently. It speaks to natural feelings in a communist, as is obvious, but not in a Catholic.

In a paragraph worthy of oblivion, the author, referring to the United States, states: "Like many members of the Cuban people I have relatives there, who certainly are not worms, lumpen or dissenters. They are honest and hard-working people who decided to emigrate "(...) [ “Como muchos miembros del pueblo cubano tengo familiares allí, que por cierto no son gusanos, lumpens ni disidentes. Son personas honestas y trabajadoras que decidieron emigrar” (…).].

I insist that I never thought to read such words in a Christian publication. The derogatory term "worm" [gusano] was devised and used without any modesty by the founder of the Castro dynasty to refer to other human beings who disagreed with him and his misguided politics; It was delivered from high level forums and used in a habitual way as an inseparable part of the "revolutionary" neo-lingua. The word "worms", in the mouth of Fidel Castro, was a blood brother to the [term] "the cockroaches" applied to those who Adolf Hitler sought to harm, and to "the rats" of the North Korean Kim Il-Sung.

It was a rude, but unfortunately effective, means to denigrate the adversary, to deny it and to turn it into a "non-person". Its use in everyday language was the essential prologue to transform everyone who disagreed into a valid object of whatever abuse and outrage occurred to the hierarchies of the New Regime. What should be done with a worm? Despise it and squash it!

But the generalized use of that word, with that meaning, dates from the early days of the Revolution, decades ago. Recently, I have not read it even in Granma, which says a lot. In fact, in that pejorative sense I do not remember having seen it printed for years, not at least until now until and in Christian Life - no less a Catholic newspaper! - used it again.

Something similar, although not so clear, happens with the neologism "lumpens". Of course, this term has its correct meaning, but it has also been prostituted by totalitarianism. During the Mariel Boatlift, this term was applied not only to convicts taken from prisons or other antisocials (who could legitimately deserve this qualification, which does not justify being publicly insulted in this way). It was also used for decent people picked up by their relatives.

Finally, Pernús includes the "dissidents"; that is, it presents the one who disagrees as another supposed personification of evil. Despite the distance that separates them, that embarrassing paragraph reminds me of an anecdote from the Dominican Republic. In the first democratic elections held there after the elimination of the tyrant Trujillo, there were two favorite presidential candidates: Viriato Fiallo and Juan Bosch.

In a campaign rally, the former referred to all his compatriots, but tried to emphasize the point with some repulsive words: "Blacks, mulattos and decent people" ... The phrase, of clear racist content, pronounced in a country where the process of miscegenation is very advanced, it showed that Mr. Fiallo, in addition to a bad man, was a terrible politician. Not for nothing did Bosch win decisively.

Now Pernús does something similar. To end his disgusting paragraph with a flourish, he puts on one side those people identified as "worms, lumpens (and) dissidents." On the other, and above them, he places the "honest and hardworking people" And to have had to read this disgusting thing in a Christian organ!]


Carta 2da. a Superior Jesuitas de Cuba: Sancione subordinado libelista según Derecho Canónico
Sacerdote que publicó injurias contra emigrados y disidentes, se niega a rectificar, afirma: “Yo soy responsable. El sentido literal puede parecer ofensivo, pero hay que leerlo en sentido espiritual”
La Habana, 5 de marzo, 2018.
Superior de la Compañía de Jesús en Cuba,
R. P. Juan Miguel Arregui:
Le agradezco la entrevista con el Director de “Vida Cristiana”, P. Eduardo García Tamayo, S. J. Ambos, tratamos, el 2 de marzo, sobre su publicación de injurias mediante libelo, contra los emigrados y disidentes cubanos. La entrevista resultó frustrante.
Como católico, sufrí vergüenza al escuchar a un sacerdote de cabellos blancos, sostener:
El sentido literal del párrafo puede parecer ofensivo, pero su sentido espiritual es todo lo contrario, no hay que entenderlo en sentido literal, sino interpretarlo como hacemos con la Biblia, que no la interpretamos literalmente. Lo escribimos para el lector inteligente, que leería entre líneas lo contrario, los inteligentes en el Espíritu”.
Conoce el significado de las injurias que publicó: “No dirigíamos esas expresiones a quienes históricamente se las dirigían, sino para enrostrárselo a quienes las utilizaban para disminuir a una persona, difamarla y quitarle valor político”.
Al proponerle que diera esa misma explicación al público y retirara el artículo de la web de “Vida Cristiana”, respondió:
Sólo dos personas lo interpretaron como ofensivo, René Gómez Manzano y Ud., el resto de los 50 000 lectores no lo vieron así. Si hubiera sido error nuestro, sí, pero lo usamos a sabiendas, con el propósito de criticar eso. No es necesario excusarnos.”
Ignoro los argumentos de Julio Pernús, el autor de las injurias: El P. García Tamayo, decidió que éste, no lo acompañara a la entrevista.
Pernús, es un periodista oficialista, evangelizador sin evangelizar, le publican comentarios políticos con impostados de religión, pobre redacción, argumentación confusa, no concluye las ideas. Y escribió de sí mismo en la “Vida Cristiana” del 18 de febrero: “Soy revolucionario”.
Lo cual explica que encontrara normal usar el lenguaje oficial que le inculcaron desde niño.
R.P. Juan Miguel Arregui, S.J., espero entienda que defender lo indefendible aumentará este escándalo.
De ocurrir lo mismo en un país con prensa libre, como España, Ud., lo hubiera resuelto en horas. Para no ver acusada a su Orden, en cada órgano de prensa, cada noticiero y ante algún tribunal. El totalitarismo, libra de esa preocupación a las instituciones que oprime.
El P. García Tamayo exige confianza: “Nuestra trayectoria demuestra que seriamos incapaces de esa mala intención”. Pero la confianza en los religiosos se cotiza muy bajo hoy. Conviene no malgastarla en empresa perdida. Elévela con la rectificación franca.
Los sofismas del Director, no le ganan la discusión al idioma Español. Porque es una frase en estilo directo, breve, clara y nada en su contexto permite entenderle otro sentido que el de un juicio de valor entre dos sectores sociales:
Los “gusanos, lumpens y disidentes”, de una parte, y los “cubanos honestos y trabajadores, de la otra.”
No hay nada “espiritual” ni “entre líneas”, que sugiera la menor critica a quienes usan esas expresiones. El autor, simplemente, expuso su opinión.
No existe código penal o de ética periodística que no califique un párrafo así como un ilícito. Viola “el derecho al buen nombre”, el artículo 12 de la Declaración de Derechos Humanos (1948). Documentos de la O.N.U. contra la discriminación.
Tipifica jurídicamente como “injurias mediante libelo” y “difamación”.
Si los argumentos del P. Eduardo García Tamayo, fueran válidos, sería imposible en el Mundo enjuiciar a nadie por injurias, calumnia y libelo. Se exonerarían con: “No lo dije en su sentido literal”.
De esta manera lo verá cualquier asociación internacional de prensa, o de Derechos Humanos o tribunal donde llevemos este caso (excepto los de Cuba).
Incluso si todo fuera maligna tergiversación mía, para hacer política, lo correcto sería hacerle justicia a los agraviados, y acallarnos “a los que atacamos a la Iglesia”, con retirar de la web de “Vida Cristiana”, el libelo “El Amor todo lo espera”, número 2769.
Y publicar la correspondiente reparación pública. Con explicaciones creíbles.
Pero entonces no tendrían más remedio que declarar que la Iglesia, desaprueba esas descalificaciones y reconoce que emigrantes y disidentes merecen el respeto al “derecho natural a la dignidad humana” (Encíclica Pacem in Terris).
Si se niegan por miedo a desagradar al César… Pues, no hubieran destapado esta letrina, que el P. García Tamayo, dice que huele a rosas. Con comentarios políticos de un gubernamental.
Corresponde a Ud., poner orden. También al Arzobispo de La Habana, S.E.R. Juan de la C. García Rodríguez, pues “Vida Cristiana” se publica bajo licencia eclesiastica.
Tenemos derecho a no ser injuriados por la Iglesia, seamos dos, o uno. Reparar injurias no es estadístico. ¿Quieren números?, influimos a cientos de lectores en el Mundo. No todo ofendido se queja. Y nadie encuestó a los otros 50 000.
Actúe como si estuviera en España y no, impune, en país de tiranía. Aplique a su subordinado libelista la sanción que le corresponda, según el Derecho Penal Canónico. Y que este ascender la jerarquía con reclamaciones concluya.
Que Dios lo ilumine y bendiga y a nuestra Iglesia en crisis.
Jaime Leygonier Fernández, feligrés de “Jesús del Monte”, La Habana, Cuba.

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